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Ethics & Animals

Speciesism Not Justified
Those of us who have become con
vinced tha,t nonhuman animals are
morally
consider'able
rights-bearers
have frequently relied on the rejection
of speciesism in our arguments with
our opponents.
If certain humans
with impa i red menta I capacities have
rights, we have urged, nonhuman
animals
with
comparable capacities
must have rights too. To deny rights
to the latter is to assume that spec
ies-membership
is morally
relevant
("speciesism")-an assumption just as
indefensible as
racism or sexism.
According to Michael Wreen, however,
we are mistaken: the rejection of
speciesism is unwarranted.
Wreen S importa nt cha lIenge, in his
"In Defense of Speciesism,"l is sub
tle, interesting, and laced with a
powerful
moral appeal
to justice.
Nevertheless, I wi II a rg ue here that
he fails to make his case. In particu
la r, the appeal to justice at the hea rt
of his argument is an appeal which is
simply not avai lable to him.
I

The
issues
here
are
complex
enough to warrant some preliminary
distinctions.
Presumably
everyone
agr'ees that
if anyone
has basic
rights, including a right to life, a
person does.
Although he does not
explicate the concept of personhood,
Wreen r~fers us to Joel Feinberg's
analysis.
A person in the purely
descriptive sense is an individual who
is self-aware, sentient, capable of
emotions, able to learn, reason, and
plan. 2 Personhood is defined in terms
of mental capacities.
For the sake of
argument,
let us
now make two
assumptions,
the
first
relatively
uncontroversial and the second (to my
mind) dubious.
Suppose (1) that all

individuals who are persons have
basic rights, including the right to
life.
Suppose further (2) that any
set of mental capacities possessed by
an individual which falls short of
those characterizing pel'sonhood is not
in itself sufficient to warrant the
ascription of basic rights to that indi
vidual (I will question this assumption
later). Now, it is a ·matter of contin
gent fact that, while most humans are
persons, some are not.
What would
the moral status (if any) of these
human nonpersons be?
At this point, I suggest we distin
guish humans who are potential per
sons from those who are not.
Just
how this is to be done, and just who
is to count as a potential person, are
notoriously difficult problems which I
am not foolish enough to try to solve
here. There does, however, seem to
be an
impol'tant moral
difference
between an individual who will soon be
a person and one who can never' be
one.
Perhaps individuals who are or
will be persons qualify for basic
rights.
(Feinberg rejects this on the
g rou nd that potential possession of
rights is not actual possession of
rights,3 but, as Wreen rightly points
out, the suggestion is that actual or
potential personhood is sufficient for
actual possession of rights. 4 ) Let us
set humans who are potential persons
aside for the purpose of this discus
sion, then.
I will argue that even if
potential persons are excluded from
the class of problem cases, speciesism
fails to be justified.
There are humans who a re not and
never will be persons, such as the
severely
brain-damaged.
If
their
mental capacities do not in themselves
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t'rant the ascription of basic rights
to them, and if no other characteristic
they have is sufficient to warrant
bas ic I'ights
t'ights for them, these h uma n
nonpel'sons
nonpet'sons are not (and never will
be) rights-bearers.
The implications
of this view al'e shocking to many of
us, but a gl"owing number of philoso
phel"s appear' to accept them.
phet"s
Con
sider' a twist on the Baby Fae case.
Assume that the baby has a right to
life because she is a potential person ..
On the view being discussed, not only
would
wou ld there be nothing
noth i ng wrong in
using a
severely
retarded
human
infant as a heal't
heat't donor (resulting in
its death) for the mentally normal
baby: we might even be obi igated to
do it.
(Let us suppose that we harm
no normal human-e.g., the r"etarded
t"etarded
baby's parents-by our actions.)
If,
however, we were to refuse to use the
retarded baby's heart on the ground
that the baby is human, and use the
heal't
heat't
of
a
nonhuman
nonperson
instead (assuming that this will not
significantly increase the risk for the
normal baby), we would be guilty of
indefensible speciesism. 5
(People who
really accept speciesism are of course
unmoved by anti-speciesism arguments
from supporters of animal rights.)
An alternative is to propose that
human nonpersons do after all have a
characteristic sufficient to warrant the
ascription of basic rights to them:
membership in a species in which per
sonhood is the norm.
Wreen defends
this proposal in his paper by making
two appeals: an appeal to metaphysics
(or
"quasi-metaphysics")
and
an
fai rness.
I will
wi II considet'
con s idel'
appeal· to fairness.
each in turn.
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(I P) [I dentification Pri nciple] It
is a necessary truth that the
statement 'X is a live human
being' is good evidence for the
statement 'X is a human per
son. '7
It seems to follow, he says, "though
this must be taken with caution, that
there
is
an
intimate
connection
between basic rights, such as a right
to life, and humanity, here taken
biologically. "8
There al"e
at"e several serious objec
tions
to
this
"quasi-metaphysical"
appeal, some of which Wreen antici
pates.
First,
(IP)
is
not
really
defended by Wreen.
He says it is a
near relative" of a· principle defended
by other authors; viz., "it is a nec
essary truth that bodily identity is
evidence for personal identity." 9. How
is (I P), according to which "it is a
necessary truth that 'X is a live
human being' is good evidence for ·X
is a human person'," a "near relative"
of this principle? Surely the 'identi
ty' referred to by the bodily-personal
identity pl"inciple
pt"inciple is not the same as
the 'identification' in ("(IP).
I P) .
In
I n the
former case, we are speaking of iden
tity in the sense of 'sameness;' in the
case
of
(I P),
the
recognition
("identification") of personhood is the
issue.
Wreen himself notes that the
personal identity criterion concerns
"re- identification" rather than "identi
fication," but he fails to provide the
very sepa rate justification needed for
(IP).
(I P) .
Furthermore,
Fu rthermore,
(IP)
(I P)
is
quite
qu ite
implausible on the face of it.
It is
easy enough to imagine a world in
which 'X is a live human being' is not
good evidence for 'X is a human per
son.
How, then, can the evidential
claim be a necessary truth?
Finally,
suppose that we even accept (I P):
what would it show? At best it would
show that all live humans are pre
sumptive persons.
This presumption
is obviously not sufficient for the
ascription of basic rights to human
nonpersons (assuming, as Wreen does
It

I

Beginning,
reasonably
enough,
from the human point of view, Wreen
argues that "thel"e is a quasi-meta
physical linkage between the concepts
of a person and a human being. "6
Wreen suggests' that the two concepts
al"e
at"e "cdteriologically related."
The
relationship goes something like this:
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but I do not, that persons are the
primary po~sessors of basic rights).
These human nonpersons are readily
identifiable.
Wreen is well aware of
this problem:
This, of cour'se,
is not to
establish that there is a link
age [between the concepts of a
person and of a human being]
enough to support the flow, so
to speak, of basic rights into
human beings per se. 10
Why, then, invoke this "quasi-meta
physical" linkage in the first place?
At this point, I will hazard a guess
as to why Wreen invokes a principle
wh ich he knows very well to be too
weak
to
support
speciesism.
T h ro ugh 0 u t his a rt i c Ie, he st r'e sse s
the importance of ou r abi I ity to iden
tify with human nonpersons. We are
able to imagine ourselves in the oth
er's place, to see ourselves, as it
were, as being those humans.
'Iden
tification' in this sense is really empa
thy (not to be confu sed with sympa
thy).
(Since
this
sense
of
'identification' is utterly different from
that of 'identification' in (I P), I will
call it 'psychological identification' in
contexts where ambiguity might other
wise result.)
Wreen holds that we
have no comparable ability to identify
with human nonpersons.
Often, it
quite true that we restrict ou r empa
thy to humans.
E.g., if Baby Fae
had had two equally suitable live
heart donors, one a human nonperson
and the other a nonhuman nonperson,
most human persons would only iden
tify with the former.
Wreen hopes to
use metaphysics
to
legitimize this
one-sided
psychological
propensity.
After introducing (I P), he has this to
say:
For it would seem, first, that
there is at least a quasi-meta
physical linkage between the
concepts of a person and a
human being, and second, that
ou r abi I ity to identify with
human non-persons in a way
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that we seem not to identify
with sentient and intelligent
non-human
non-persons thus
has
a
solid
metaphysical
basis. 11
This will not do, ·however. How can a
"quasi;..metaphysical linkage" provide
"a solid metaphysical basis"?
The
"necessity" which allegedly relates the
concepts of pet'son and of human
being does not begin to be necessary
enough to do this job--even if it does
obtain, which is doubtful-especially in
view of the two very different· senses
of 'identification' in use her'e.
Wreen
is
correct,
though,
in
stressing the moral importance of psy
chological
identification.
Withol.Jt
empathy,
how could one take the
moral poi nt of view?
On the other
hand, one must be extremely wary
about using this capacity selectively.
It is, of course, easier to identify
with those most similar to us and
familiar to us.
This tendency is both
psychologically
understandable
and
morally suspect.
It is the root of
bigotry.
The problem is not that one
cqnnot identify with those· who are
different and unfamiliar: one simply
doesn't bother.
One dismisses them
beforehand as unworthy of our con
sideration.
Joseph
Mengele,
for
example, was reportedly fond of the
"Aryan" children of a couple who
shielded him in Brazil, but he had no
about
tortu ring
and
compu nctions
exterminating Jewish children.
They
were simply experimental subjects to
him ("objects" would
be a better
term), expendable, "worthless" (apart
from their research value, that is)
lives.
There is no reason to believe
that he derived pleasu re from thei r
sufferi ng: they simply did not matter
to him as individuals.
A great. many humans take the
same attitude toward nonhuman animals
as Mengele took toward Jews.
While
(one hop·es) relatively few humans
refuse to identify with unfortunate
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human nonpersons, few also bother to
identify with members of other spec
ies. Yet, with only a bit of thought,
it is just as natural and automatic to
identify
with
nonhuman
animals
(whether~ or not they al"e persons) as
with humans.
We read about baby
seals stunned by steel-tipped clubs,
skinned alive and tossed aside to die
as their bellowing mothers helplesslY
watch.
It would be very difficult not
to identify with these animals.
A
simi la r~ fate cou Id have been ou t~S, had
we been Afghani children bludgeoned
to death or bu rned to death by Soviet
soldiers, or the parents forced to
watch. ·We ,~ead about nonhuman lab
orator'y animals who have poisons
smeared into their eyes, vaginas, or
rectums.
Is it rea Ily d ifficu It to
identify with these animals?
Had we
been inmates of Auschwitz whom Men
gele had decided to "spare" for his
experiments, the same fate could have
been ours.
I submit, contrary to
Wreen, that we can identify with such
nonhuman animals in the same way in
which we do with human animals. The
only effort
needed is
the effort
requir'ed to become awar'e of the facts.
Thus, I don't object to Wreen's
str'ess on psychological identification;�
identification;
. I object to the. limited scope he�
he
. assigns it and to his (unsuccessful, I�I
have argued) attempt to pt'ovide a�a
metaphysical basis for that limited�
limited
scope.
However, Wreen uses psycho�
psycho
logical identification very effectively�
effectively
. in the second part of his defense of
speciesism: the appeal to fairness.
Indeed, psychological identification is
the link between the two parts of his
argument.
Let us now turn to the
appeal to fairness.
Wreen
sketches
three
powerful
examples of humans who are or who
have become nonper'sons through no
fault of their own: the friend who has
had a terrible car accident (you
almost rode with him), the fraternal
twin who was born severely retarded
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(you are normal), and the childhood
acquaintance who is now institutional
ized (you are one of his doctors). We
certainly do identify closely with suC;;h
individuals.
We are, as he says,
keenly aware of how unlucky they
have been-and how lucky, by con
trast, we are.
This is the signifi
cance of psychological identification: it
brings
home to us
the essential
"u nfai rness"
of
such
situation s.
W,'een concludes that:
Human
non-persons,
then,
should
be
ascribed
basic
rights; for although in the
primary case it is persons who
are
ascribed
basic
rights,
equality of opportunity, or,
better, fairness, requires us
to ascribe basic
rights
to
human nonpersons as well. 12
Ascribing basic rights to human non
persons is "due restitution for such a
fu ndamental i nj u stice; " 13 it is "com
pensation for having been denied per
son hood," 14 according to Wreen. This
cannot be said of nonhuman nonper
sons who belong to a species in which
personhood is not the norm.
"Foul
fortune" did not prevent the shark
from becoming a person; the shark
would not have been a shark if it had
been a person.
To retu rn to my
example, the living human nonperson
whose heart could be transplanted into
a human person has been dealt an
injustice by the "Cosmos", Wreen
wou Id say; the nonperson who belongs
to a species of nonpersons has not.
Therefore the latter, not the former,
should be used as the organ qonor
(assuming
both
organs
would
be
equally suitable); speciesism in this
sense, Wreen concludes, is justified.
Wreen's examples are compelling
and his plea for justice moving, but
there are serious difficulties in his
a rg ument-at least one of them fatal.
Fi rst, at most Wreen has made .a
case for the ascription of basic rights
to those human nonpersons whose
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condition IS no fault of their' own.
Although Wreen states that there is
little or nothing we can do to prevent
the loss of our personhood,ls this is
often not the case. Consider the vic
tim of an unsuccessful suicide attempt
who is now conscious but perma
nently, severely brain damaged.
Or
consider the Hollywood stu nt per
fOI'mer who ma kes a ca reer out of
dan g e ro u sst u n t san d los e s his 0 r her
personhood as a result.
Less dra
matic cases abou nd.
What about the
individual who is too fond of fatty
foods and physical inactivity to ward
off atheroscler'osis, becoming senile as
a result?
Or the motorcyclist who
refuses to wear a helmet?
Or the
driver or passenger who doesn't wear
a seat belt? These human nonpersons
don't have a right to Iife on Wreen' s
view.
I for one find this thoroughly
counter-intuitive (unless the individu
als have become brain dead or irre
versibly comatose 16) .
Second, Wreen himself raises the
objection that his conceptual frame
work appears incoherent. What sense
does it make to talk about the unfair
ness or injustice of nature or the uni
verse, or' about basic rights being
accorded as restitution or compensa
tion for such injustice? If there were
"A Supreme Court of Justice of the
Cosmos" this would be intelligible, but
as far as we know there is none.
I
don't think Wreen takes this objection
nearly seriously enough.
He replies
that the terms he uses a re merely
"convenient
and
vivid"
metaphors
which are used by "all" those who
employ the concept of basic rights. 17
I find this hard to believe: surely
there are proponents of basic rights
who do not personify nature, let alone
at critical points in their arguments.
It ma kes perfectly good sense to
speak of persons respecting the rights
of others and compensating them when
their rights are violated; indeed, as
Ernest Partridge puts it, "the very
concept
of
'morality'
presupposes
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personhood [i.e., mor'al agency]."18
If Wreen's metaphors really are mere
conveniences
and
their
implicit
anthropomorphism "not - inextirpable",
he needs to show us how to cast his
argument in a conceptually coherent
way.
Then he. wou Id be entitled to
use these metaphors.
Suppose Wreen could handle this
second objection, however'.
He would
still face a third, and fatal, objection:
circularity.
He argues that human
nonperson s s hou Id be ascr'ibed bas ic
rights as restitution for the injustice
dealt to them by nature:
Basic morality, per'haps natural
law, ensures at least the mini
mum of fairness here,
and
r'edr'esses the mOI'a! balance,
makes up for nature's inhu
manity
to
humanity,
by
according basic rights. 19
This implies that human nonpersons
have the r'ight to fai rness (equated
with justice), to "equality of oppot'tu
nity"20 or "a fair chance"21 of becom
ing and remaining a pet'son.
When
wrongfu Ily dep rived of th is "bi rth
l'ight"22 they are due basic rights as
compensation.
However', this argu
ment plainly presupposes that they
al ready have a basic right: the r'ight
to fairness or justice. Wreen's appeal
to justice for, e.g., the Down's Syn
drome twin brother, seems so moving
because we assume such an individual
has rights.
This assumption may be
true-I think that it is-but Wreen can
not use it as a premise in his ar'gu
ment. This is the very conclusion he
must establish.
Could Wreen's argument be recast
in a noncircular way?
Suppose he
were to g ra nt at the outset that
human nonpersons are morally consid
erable-not, of cou rse, by vi rtue of
their humanity, but by virtue of their
sentience or potential sentience, or
some other non-speciesist characteris
tic-and have some rights. The rights
they have, he could say, are those

127

E&A V/4

commensurate with their
capacities
(e.g., the r~ight not to have unneces
sary suffer';ng inflicted on them).
But, he could argue, these capacities
by themselves are insufficient for a
right to life. 23 Could Wreen argue
that one of the rights they do possess
is the right to an equal opportunity,
or "afail~ chance," to become and
1 emain persons, and that we owe them
the right to life as compensation for
the denial of their "fair chance?"
I
think not.
The right to an equal
opportunity for bec.oming and remain
ing a pel~son presupposes a I~ight to
life-for without the lattel~ right, the
for·mer could never be exercised.
Although the right not to be caused
gt~atuitous suffering is not violated by
painless, fearless death, the right to
a fair chance at being and remaining a
person certainly would be.
4

Therefore, speciesism has not been
justified. Those who believe that the
mental capacities of a h uma n non per
son are not sufficient to wal~rant the
ascription of basic l~ights, or a right
to life, to that individual are morally
inconsistent if they give preference to
him 0 r her. over a non hum an' non per
son.
But should we accept the assump
tion that only persons (and maybe
potential per~sons) have a right to
life? If we do, ironically, it may well
be the case that many nonhuman ani
mals will qualify for this right while
some sentient humans will not.
Etho
logists have recently provided evi
dence for the person hood, in Fe; n
ber~g's descl~iptive sense,
of many
nonhuman animals-not just apes, dol
phins,
and
whales. 24
If
"those

bei ngs who a re con sciou s, have a
concept and awareness of themselves,
are capable of experiencing emotions,
can reason and acquire understand
ing, can plan ahead, can act on their
plans, and can feel pleasure or pain"
al~e persons, the "moral club" very
probably needs to be open to menibers
of many other species.
If these writ
ers are correct, many nonhuman ani
mals have capacities which fal~ outstrip
those of certain humans.
Indeed, an
animal whose capacities were equiva
lent to those of humans with advanced
Alzheimer's Disease could not survive
in nature.
Howeve r, I bel ieve it wou Id be a
major mistake to deny that such
human nonpel~sons have a right to
life. These beings are conscious and
self-aware enough-if on Iy for brief
periods-to have lives wh ich matter to
them (positively or negatively)
in
some sense.
They need not think of
themselves in sophisticated terms to
be individuals with interests. To use
Tom Regan's phrase, they are "sub
jects of lives,"
lives which
have
value-to them, although again not
necessarily in sophisticated terms-in
dependently of anyone else's inter
ests. 25
I will not repeat Regan's
arguments here, but I do want to
express my agreement: lives like these
al~e not expendable. 26
Rega rd less of how one decides
upon the proper criteria for having a
right to life, however, one thing
seems correct.
Species membership
has not yet been shown to be a mor
ally relevant consideration
in that
decision.

Evelyn B. Pluhar
Pennsylvania State University, Fayette
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